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ABSTRACT  
The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has a host of tools to punish 
insider trading and other fraudulent investing activity. One of its most 
powerful weapons is the disgorgement of profits. In federal court, the SEC 
frequently seeks the disgorgement of ill-gotten profits by criminal 
defendants. However, disgorgement is an imprecise instrument. In the 
high-speed world of institutional investing, it can be incredibly difficult for 
the SEC to prove exactly which profits were ill-gotten and which were not. 
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The difficulty arises because it is nearly impossible to prove with precision 
what gains were due to the ill-advised tip from an insider and what gains 
were due to the benign swings of the stock market.   
Given the difficulty, courts have found that precision is too high a bar. In 
SEC v. First City Financial Corp., a watershed 1989 case, the D.C. Circuit 
held that, given the inherent difficulty in proving causation with precision, 
the SEC only had to provide a “reasonable approximation” of ill-gotten 
gain. Essentially, once the SEC provided a ballpark estimate of the 
defendants’ gain, the onus was on the defendants to prove that 
approximation was wrong. This burden-shifting framework quickly spread 
to the other circuits, with varying applications.  
The framework set out by the D.C. Circuit shifted the burden of proving 
precisely the amount to be disgorged, but it did not shift the burden of 
proving causation. This imbalance has created a contradiction in the law 
because the prosecution’s burden of proving proximate causation runs 
directly counter to the reasonable approximation rule of First Financial 
Corp. In proving damages, the burden-shifting framework only requires the 
SEC to prove a “reasonable approximation” of ill-gotten gains; however, in 
proving proximate cause, the SEC must prove with exactitude the profits 
that flowed from the wrong committed.  The classic First Financial Corp. 
framework would allow the SEC to provide a reasonable approximation of 
profits for one element of the crime, but be forced to specifically prove 
damages in the other. Thus, if the SEC were required to prove that the 
profits received by defendants were proximately caused by their misdeeds, it 
would completely undermine the burden-shifting framework of First 
Financial Corp.  
The Third Circuit solved this dilemma in SEC v. Teo by relaxing the 
SEC’s burden to prove causation.  In SEC v. Teo, the Third Circuit held that 
the SEC does not have the burden of proving proximate cause. Rather, the 
SEC must only prove but-for causation between alleged wrongdoing and ill-
gotten profits, which means that it must only prove that the defendant’s 
profits would not have occurred, but for his unlawful actions. Once that is 
proven, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the rest of his 
profits were not proximately connected to his unlawful gains.  
The Third Circuit’s decision in SEC v. Teo was correctly decided. By 
relaxing the burden of proving causation, the Third Circuit has aligned the 
burden of proving causation with the burden of proving ill-gotten profits. 
The synergy between the rules requiring only but-for causation and 
“reasonable approximation” of ill-gotten profits is too great to be ignored 
by the other circuits. The other circuits should join the Third Circuit in 
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extending the reasoning of First Financial Corp. to the issue of proximate 
causation.  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On February 10, 2014, in SEC v. Teo, the Third Circuit held that, in an 
action for disgorgement of profits under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, the SEC does not have the burden of proving that the illegal activity 
complained of proximately caused the profits sought to be disgorged.1 
Instead, the Third Circuit reasoned that the relevant case law only required 
the SEC to prove but-for causation between alleged wrongdoing and ill-
gotten profits. In holding that the SEC needs only to prove but-for 
causation in disgorgement cases, the Third Circuit in SEC v. Teo2 primarily 
rested on the authority of SEC v. First City Financial Corp., which in turn 
relied on SEC v. MacDonald.3 The holding in Teo created a split with the 
other circuits, which have all required the SEC to show at least some level of 
proximate cause.4 Despite this circuit split, the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari when the defendants in Teo appealed.5 
This Note argues that the Third Circuit’s decision in SEC v. Teo was 
correctly decided.6 After discussing the development of the SEC’s 
enforcement powers, Part III of this Note analyzes the formation of the 
current causation test created by the D.C. Circuit in SEC v. First City 
Financial Corp., and its precedential development in SEC v. Macdonald. 
Part IV of this Note discusses the factual and procedural history of SEC v. 
                                                                                                                                      
 1. SEC v. Teo, 746 F.3d 90, 107 (3d. Cir. 2014). 
 2. SEE TEO, 746 F.3D AT 105-06.  
 3. SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983). 
 4. John P. Quinn, A Cause for Concern: The Need for Proximate Cause in SEC Enforcement 
Actions and How the Third Circuit Got It Wrong in Sec v. Teo, 56 B.C.L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT 138, 
140 (2015). 
 5. Id.  
 6. See Teo, 746 F.3d at 107 (holding that the investor was unjustly enriched as a result of his 
securities violations). Proximate cause can be thought of as a policy question asking how far 
liability for a particular action should extend. See Peter Tipps, Note, Controlling the Lead Paint 
Debate: Why Control Is Not an Element of Public Nuisance, 50 B.C.L. REV. 605, 628-29 
(2009) (discussing the characteristics of proximate cause within the context of public nuisance 
liability). Proximate cause examines how far removed an individual’s conduct is from a resulting 
harm, and seeks to determine if the harm was a foreseeable consequence of that harm. See id. As 
applied to the remedy of disgorgement, proximate cause examines whether or not the defendant’s 
profit is directly attributable to the underlying wrong, taking into account causal 
attenuation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 51 cmt. f (2011) (discussing causation 
and remoteness as applied to the elements of disgorgement). 
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Teo and analyzes the reasoning employed by the Third Circuit. Finally, Part 
V addresses the circuit split created by the decision in Teo and contrasts the 
Third Circuit’s correct interpretation of the application of causation in SEC 
enforcement actions with that of the conflicting circuits.  
II.  BACKGROUND 
“That most delicious of all privileges—spending other people’s money.”7 
The SEC has a host of enforcement powers that it can bring to bear against 
a fraudster. In seeking a judicial remedy, the SEC can pursue civil monetary 
penalties, an officer or director bar, injunctions, disgorgement, or other 
equitable remedies.8 The SEC may also institute an action for civil or 
criminal contempt.9 However, one of the SEC’s most powerful weapons is 
disgorgement. The SEC frequently seeks disgorgement of profits from 
illegal insider trading in federal court.10  
A. The SEC’s Equitable Remedy of Disgorgement 
The equitable remedy of disgorgement is designed to deprive fraudsters 
of ill-gotten gains whereby they have been unjustly enriched.11 The SEC 
defines disgorgement as “the repayment of illegally gained profits (or 
avoided losses) for distribution to harmed investors whenever feasible.”12 
Disgorgement is not primarily intended to compensate victims, but instead 
                                                                                                                                      
 7. John Randolph of Roanoke, http://izquotes.com/quote/349748 (last accessed Nov. 15, 
2017). 
 8. Insider Trading, Third Edition § 7.01 (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.).  
 9. Id.  
 10. See, e.g., SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656, 662-63 (7th Cir. 2002); SEC v. Manor Nursing 
Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1103 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Chester Holdings, Ltd., 41 F. Supp. 2d 505, 
528 (D.N.J. 1999); SEC v. R. J. Allen & Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 866, 880 (S.D. Fla. 1974). 
 11. Teo, 746 F.3d at 105; see also SEC v. Contorinis, 743 F.3d 296, 301 (2d Cir. 
2014) (“Disgorgement is an equitable remedy, imposed to ‘forc[e] a defendant to give up the 
amount by which he was unjustly enriched.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting FTC v. Bronson 
Partners, 654 F.3d 359, 372 (2d Cir. 2011)). 
 12. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Agency Financial Report: Fiscal Year 2014, at 66 n.9. (2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secafr2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/DD7S-FRLK]. 
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to deter future violations of securities law.13 As a deterrent, disgorgement is 
highly effective since awards are often punishingly large.14  
Disgorgement is a highly effective weapon in the SEC’s litigation arsenal. 
The Commission collects considerably more money from disgorgement 
remedies than it does in civil penalties. In 2014 (fiscal year) alone, the SEC 
recovered $2.788 billion in disgorgement of illegal profit.15 Meanwhile, the 
Commission recovered only $1.378 billion in civil penalties in the same 
period.16  
B. Historical Underpinnings of Disgorgement Power 
Courts have broad latitude in granting disgorgement because it is an 
equitable remedy, and fashioning equitable remedies is an inherent power 
of the court.17 Further, the various securities acts specifically provide the 
courts with broad equity powers to fashion remedies in securities fraud 
cases.18 However, neither The Dodd Frank, Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, nor the other securities acts, specifically give the 
SEC the statutory right to seek disgorgement in federal court.19  
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) does, however, specifically provide for 
equitable remedies. In Section 305(b), SOX provides that “[i]n any action or 
proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission under any provision 
of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may 
grant, any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the 
                                                                                                                                      
 13. SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 117 (2d Cir. 2006) (“In a securities enforcement action, 
as in other contexts, ‘disgorgement’ is not available primarily to compensate victims. Instead, 
disgorgement has been used by the SEC and courts to prevent wrongdoers from unjustly 
enriching themselves through violations, which has the effect of deterring subsequent fraud.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Russell G. Ryan, The Equity Facade of SEC Disgorgement, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 
ONLINE 1, 2-3, n.12 (2013), http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Ryan__The-
Equity-Fa%C3%A7ade-of-SEC-Disgorgement.pdf [https://perma.cc/TG3D-6PD5] (“In practice . . 
. the SEC rarely uses administrative proceedings to pursue contested disgorgement claims, 
preferring instead to file and litigate such claims in federal court.”). 
 15. These figures include both orders from SEC cease-and-desist proceedings, as well as 
enforcement actions in federal court. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Select SEC and Market Data: 
Fiscal 2014, at 2 tbl.1 (2014), http://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2014.pdf[https://perma.cc/UQ6G-
Z2Z4].  
 16. Id.  
 17. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d at 118. 
 18. See supra notes 19-24 and the accompanying text.  
 19. See, e.g., SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656, 662-63 (7th Cir. 2002); SEC v. Manor Nursing 
Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1103 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Chester Holdings, Ltd., 41 F. Supp. 2d 505, 
528 (D.N.J. 1999); SEC v. R. J. Allen & Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 866, 880 (S.D. Fla. 1974). 
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benefit of investors.”20 Furthermore, SOX recognizes (and may implicitly 
endorse) the SEC’s right to seek disgorgement in Section 308(a):  
If in any judicial or administrative action brought by the 
Commission under the securities laws . . . the Commission 
obtains an order [or settlement] requiring disgorgement against 
any person and the Commission also obtains . . . a civil penalty 
against the same person, the amount of the penalty shall, on the 
motion or at the direction of the Commission, be added to and 
become part of the disgorgement fund for the benefit of the 
victims of such violation.21 
Similarly, Dodd Frank allows the SEC to “enter an order requiring 
accounting and disgorgement” in any proceeding in which the SEC can 
impose a civil penalty,22 but disgorgement is not defined anywhere in that 
statute.23  Accordingly, courts have assumed that disgorgement is 
contiguous with the equitable remedies imposed by federal judges before 
Dodd Frank was passed.24 
The courts do not rely exclusively on Dodd Frank or the other securities 
acts for authority to grant disgorgement. Even before Dodd Frank was 
enacted, the SEC routinely obtained disgorgement of gains derived from 
illegal insider trading in federal courts.25 The SEC persuaded courts to grant 
                                                                                                                                      
 20. Pub. L. 107–204, §305(b), adding Section 21(d)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, codified at 15 U.S.C. §78u(d)(5). 
 21. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §308(a), 116 Stat. 745, 784-85 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §7246(a)). 
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(e). 
 23. The SEC does not have statutory authority to seek disgorgement in federal court. Instead, 
it has asserted and courts have held that it has this authority as an equitable extension of its 
broader authority to enforce the securities laws. See, e.g., SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 
1215, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (describing disgorgement as an equitable power and noting it may not 
be used punitively). 
 24. Id.  
 25. See, e.g., SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 442 n.4 (9th Cir. 1990) (“It is well settled that §21(d) 
permits the SEC to obtain more than injunctive relief.”); id. at 453 (“The SEC’s power to obtain 
injunctive relief has been broadly read to include disgorgement of profits realized from violations 
of the securities laws.”); SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 
1989) (“Disgorgement, then, is available simply because the relevant provisions of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, sections 21(d) and (e), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d) and (e), vest jurisdiction in the 
federal courts.”); SEC v. Tome, 833 F.2d 1086, 1096 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1014 
(1988); SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978). For a lengthy discussion of disgorgement and 
the SEC’s authority to seek it, see SEC v. Aragon Capital Mgmt., LLC, 672 F. Supp. 2d 421, 437–46 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (insider trading case). 
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disgorgement pursuant to the court’s equity jurisdiction in a great number 
of cases.26  In fact, as early as 1971, the Second Circuit held in the landmark 
case SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. that “[i]t would severely defeat the 
purposes of the [1934 Act] if a violator of Rule 10b-5 were allowed to retain 
the profits from his violation.”27 
According to the Second Circuit in SEC v. Cavanagh, federal courts have 
the power to award disgorgement pursuant to their equity jurisdiction 
independent of statutory grant of authority.28  The Second Circuit showed 
that the test—originally set out by the Supreme Court in Grupo Mexicano 
de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.—for equitable jurisdiction is 
whether the remedy sought was available at chancery in 1789.29 Given that 
the term “disgorgement” was unlikely used in 1789, the Second Circuit 
analyzed the question functionally. The Court investigated whether 
defendants in 1789 were allowed to keep ill-gotten gains from their 
misdeeds.30 It found that eighteenth-century English chancellors ordered 
remedies that were functionally identical to the SEC’s disgorgement 
remedy.31 Thus, disgorgement was available at chancery, and thereby within 
the equitable jurisdiction of the court.32  
C. Application of the Disgorgement Remedy  
The SEC’s disgorgement powers are far-reaching and incredibly effective. 
The Commission routinely employs disgorgement against insider traders. 
Not only has the SEC forced disgorgement from tippees, but it has also 
obtained disgorgement from tippers.33 In some cases, the SEC has required 
                                                                                                                                      
 26. See, e.g., SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656, 662-63 (7th Cir. 2002); SEC v. Manor Nursing 
Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1103 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Chester Holdings, Ltd., 41 F. Supp. 2d 505, 
528 (D.N.J. 1999); SEC v. R. J. Allen & Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 866, 880 (S.D. Fla. 1974). 
 27. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 28. SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 118 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 29. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318-19 
(1999). 
 30. Id. (“[O]ur inquiry concerns not the name used by equity courts and commentators for 
historical remedies but rather their specific actions and the resulting practical consequences.”).  
 31. Id. at 118-20. 
 32. In finding disgorgement available at common law, the Court in Cavanagh relied on two 
cases from England and two from colonial America. Id. at 118-20.  
 33. See, e.g., SEC v. Warde, 151 F.3d 42, 48–50 (2d Cir. 1998); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 453 
(9th Cir. 1990); SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 
1005 (1971); SEC v. Michel, 521 F. Supp. 2d 795, 831 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (ordering stockbroker insider 
trading defendant to disgorge his own profits, the profits of his tippees, and the commissions 
earned on his client/tippees’ trades). 
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tippers to disgorge profits earned by tippees—even if the tippees complied 
with federal securities law.34 In SEC v. Antar, the court ordered innocent 
investors, who did not cooperate in the fraud, to disgorge their profits.35 In 
that case, a defendant sold stock in an initial public offering (IPO) while in 
possession of material nonpublic adverse information.36 Accordingly, he 
was convicted of insider trading. The SEC did not allege that the other 
innocent investors who participated in the offering were even aware of the 
fraud.37 Despite their nonparticipation and lack of knowledge, the court 
found that the innocent investors were unjustly enriched.38 Thus, the court 
ordered disgorgement of their profits.39   
Similar to the decision in SEC v. Antar, the federal district court for the 
Southern District of Florida in SEC v. Chemical Trust40 found that innocent 
parties could be required to disgorge ill-gotten gains. The court in that case 
held that “[i]t is not necessary for the person holding the property to have 
done anything wrong in order for that person to be required to return the 
property to its rightful owner.”41  The court proceeded to order the 
defendant to disgorge the gross profits it received from the illegal scheme, 
even though the defendant was not the party that had defrauded the 
investors.42 
Not only can the SEC require innocent parties to disgorge profits, the 
SEC can also require more profits to be disgorged than the insider trader 
actually received. In SEC v. Shapiro, the Second Circuit found that the 
proper measure of disgorgement was not actual profits, but rather the 
“paper profits” resulting after dissemination and absorption of the 
information, even where such profits exceed actual profits.43 The court 
reasoned accordingly: 
A violator of the securities laws should disgorge profits earned by 
trading on non-public information. Once public disclosure is 
                                                                                                                                      
 34. SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 454 (9th Cir. 1990) (reasoning that requiring a tipper to 
disgorge his tippee’s profits “is a necessary deterrent to evasion of Rule 10b-5 liability by either . . . 
enriching a friend or relative . . . or . . . tipping others with the expectation of reciprocity”). 
 35. SEC v. Antar, 15 F. Supp. 2d 477, 532–33 (D.N.J. 1998). 
 36. Id. at 533. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. SEC v. Chem. Trust, No. 00-8015-CIV, 2000 WL 33231600 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2000). 
 41. Id. at *11.  
 42. Id. at *12-13.  
 43. SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1309 (2d Cir. 1974). 
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made and all investors are trading on an equal footing, the 
violator should take the risks of the market himself. Moreover, a 
contrary holding would create a serious anomaly that might 
encourage insider trading. To require disgorgement only of 
actual profits in cases where the price of the stock subsequently 
fell would create a heads-I-win-tails-you-lose opportunity for the 
violator: he could keep subsequent profits but not suffer 
subsequent losses.44 
Given that the SEC can order a defendant to disgorge mere “paper 
profits,” it was only a short extension for federal courts to hold that the SEC 
need not prove with exactness the amount required to be disgorged. The 
D.C. Circuit held in SEC v. First City Financial Corp. that “disgorgement 
need only be a reasonable approximation of profits causally connected to 
the violation.”45 In discussing First City Financial Corp., the Second Circuit 
reasoned in SEC v. Patel that when the disgorgement measure cannot be 
exact, “any ‘risk of uncertainty . . . should fall on the wrongdoer whose 
illegal conduct created that uncertainty.’”46  
One court has gone so far as to hold that a brokerage firm must disgorge 
profits from illegal insider trading by its customers.47 In SEC v. Stephenson, 
the customers asked their broker to reverse some illegal transactions.48 
Instead of informing the customers that such a reversal was impossible, the 
firm pocketed the funds.49 The court held that the brokerage company must 
disgorge the profits because they were unjustly gained as a result of the 
fraud.50 In another case, The Seventh Circuit suggested in dicta that a court 
might be able to order disgorgement of insider trading profits received as a 
nominee of the primary defendant, provided that the nominee had no 
ownership interest in the proceeds.51  
As shown above, the court’s power to order disgorgement is founded on 
firm statutory and precedential authority.  The SEC has forced an eclectic 
mix of defendants to disgorge profits in a variety of cases. Given this broad 
                                                                                                                                      
 44. Id. See CFTC v. Am. Metals Exch. Corp., 991 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1993) (proper measure of 
disgorgement is amount of ill-gotten gains received by defendant, not amount of investor losses). 
 45. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 46. SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 140 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d at 
1232). 
 47. SEC v. Stephenson, 720 F. Supp. 370, 327-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 48. Id. at 371. 
 49. Id. at 371-73. 
 50. Id. at 373.  
 51. SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 414-15 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992). 
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equitable power, it is not unjust for federal courts to require the SEC to 
prove only but-for cause when seeking disgorgement of ill-gotten gains 
rather than requiring the SEC to prove both but-for cause and proximate 
cause.52 The federal courts have the power to require innocent individuals 
to disgorge ill-gotten profits; it is not a heavier burden to require culpable 
defendants to disgorge profits without the showing of proximate cause.   
III.  BURDEN-SHIFTING FRAMEWORK  
The SEC employs a variety of remedies to punish insider traders and 
other violators of federal securities law. One of its most powerful remedies 
is the equitable remedy of disgorgement of profits. The SEC uses this 
remedy to prevent the unjust enrichment of defendants. Unfortunately, ill-
gotten gains are extremely difficult to measure. For example, suppose that a 
stockholder purchases stock on insider information and then holds on to it 
for ten years. At the end of the decade, he sells the stock and uses the money 
to purchase a different stock in a completely legal manner. How much 
profit should he be required to disgorge? Should he be forced to disgorge 
the appreciation directly following the first purchase, or should he be 
required to return the full appreciation realized in the ten years he held the 
stock? What about the subsequent purchase? Should any profit from the 
second stock be disgorged simply because he bought it with money gained 
from insider trading? But for the insider trading, he would not have had the 
money to purchase the second stock; however, is his profit from the second 
stock proximately caused by his illegal insider trading activity?   
The courts recognize that illegal gains are difficult to measure and even 
more difficult to trace to their source. Rather than allow this difficulty to 
favor defendants, the D.C. Circuit in SEC v. First Financial Corp.53 shifted 
the burden of proving damages with certainty to the defendant. By 
universally adopting the D.C. Circuit’s burden-shifting framework, the U.S. 
Circuit Courts of Appeals have already greatly lowered the prosecutor’s 
burden of proof.   
                                                                                                                                      
 52. But-for cause is a hypothetical construct that asks whether or not a given event would 
have occurred in the same manner even if a particular factor were removed. See Price Waterhouse 
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989) (discussing the meaning of but-for cause). A particular factor 
is considered an actual cause of an event if that event would not have occurred absent the 
factor. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 cmt. b (2005) (discussing but-for cause in tort 
law). The but-for test seeks to determine if a particular factor was a necessary condition for an 
outcome, but not necessarily that it was the exclusive cause. See id. § 26 cmts. b, c. 
 53. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
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A. SEC v. First City Financial Corp., 890 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
In SEC v. First City Financial Corp., the D.C. Circuit first enacted a 
burden-shifting framework to prove causation in insider trading cases. In 
that case, the SEC charged Marc Belzberg and his company, First City 
Financial Corporation, Ltd. (“First City”), with the deliberate evasion of 
Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d),54 
and its accompanying regulations. Section 13(d)55 requires any person who 
has directly or indirectly obtained the beneficial ownership of more than 
five percent of any registered equity security to disclose the ownership (and 
other information) of such stock to the SEC within ten days.56 In this case, 
the SEC alleged that the defendant deliberately filed his required disclosures 
after the mandated ten-day period in order to facilitate his attempted hostile 
takeover of Ashland Oil Company (“Ashland”).  
The defendant corporation, First City, was a Canadian company, 
founded and controlled by the Belzberg family, that specialized in investing 
in publically traded American corporations.57 Marc Belzberg managed the 
firm’s New York City subsidiary, which was tasked with evaluating 
investment opportunities for the parent company.58 The sordid affair that 
sparked the litigation in First City Financial Corp. started with a letter on 
February 3, 1986 from a New York stockbroker to Belzberg’s father.59 The 
letter described Ashland as a “sensational business opportunity” that First 
City should consider.60  
Belzberg conducted a preliminary analysis of Ashland with his team, 
which proved to be favorable.61 Consequently, First City purchased 61,000 
                                                                                                                                      
 54. Id. at 1217. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Section 13(d) of the Act provides in pertinent part: 
Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the beneficial ownership 
of any equity security . . . is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more 
than 5 per centum of such class shall, within ten days after such acquisition or 
within such shorter time as the Commission may establish by rule, file with the 
Commission, a statement containing . . . the following information, and such 
additional information, as the Commission may . . . prescribe as necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1). 
 57. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  
 58. Id.  
 59. Id.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id.  
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shares of Ashland on February 11, 1986.62 Throughout the next month, First 
City accumulated large blocks of Ashland shares. By February 26th, First 
City owned more than 1.3 million shares of Ashland.63  This stock buildup 
left First City holding 4.8 percent of Ashland’s total outstanding stock, not 
coincidently riding just below the percentage that triggers mandatory 
reporting requirements.64  
On March 4th, Marc Belzberg called Alan Greenberg, who worked at a 
brokerage company known as Bear Sterns, about buying more Ashland 
stock.65 The meaning of that call became the flashpoint of the litigation with 
the SEC.66 Greenberg explained in his deposition that he thought the call 
was a command by Belzberg to buy Ashland stock on behalf of First City.67 
Contrarily, Belzberg later claimed that he only intended the statement to 
simply be a recommendation that Greenberg buy the stock himself on 
behalf of Bear Stearns.68 Regardless, Greenberg immediately purchased 
20,500 shares of Ashland stock.69  If Greenberg purchased the shares on 
behalf of First City, (as he contended) it pushed First City over five percent 
ownership of Ashland, thus triggering mandatory disclosure of First City’s 
ownership stake; however, if the shares were not purchased for First City, 
then First City had no duty to disclose its stock holdings to the SEC or the 
public.70  
Shortly thereafter, First City purchased the shares Greenberg had 
accumulated. Once accomplished, Belzberg’s father informed Ashland of 
First City’s stake in the company and proposed a friendly takeover.71 
Ashland rejected the offer and issued a press release stating that First City 
                                                                                                                                      
 62. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 63. Id.  
 64. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1). 
 65. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1218-19. Greenberg testified that:  
[Marc Belzberg] called me and said something to the effect that – something 
like, “It wouldn’t be a bad idea if you bought Ashland Oil here,” or something 
like that. And I took that to mean that we were going to do another put and call 
arrangement that we had done in the past. . . . I was absolutely under the 
impression I was buying at their risk and I was going to do a put and call. 
Id.  
 68. Id. at 1219. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 1220.   
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owned between eight and nine percent of its stock.72 On March 26th, First 
City finally filed the Schedule 13D disclosure.73 On March 31st, Ashland 
agreed to buy back First City’s shares for $51 per share, resulting in a $15.4 
million profit for First City.74 
When the SEC found out about the sale, it initiated an informal 
investigation into the timeliness of the 13D disclosure.75 After deposing 
Belzberg and Greenberg, the SEC filed suit against Belzberg and First City, 
alleging that they crossed the five percent threshold on March 4th, but did 
not file the required disclosure statement until March 26th, twelve days 
after the section 13(d) deadline.76  
The district court found that First City and Marc Belzberg entered into 
an informal put and call agreement on March 4th, and then deliberately 
violated the ten-day filing requirement of Section 13(d).77  The district court 
permanently enjoined the defendants from future violations of Section 
13(d) and ordered First City and Belzberg to disgorge the approximately 
$2.7 million representing their profits on the 890,000 shares of Ashland 
stock acquired between March 14th and 25th.78 The district court reasoned 
that the defendants were able to purchase the shares at artificially low prices 
because of the defendants’ failure to make the Section 13(d) disclosure on 
March 14th.79 The defendants appealed the injunction and disgorgement 
remedies as an abuse of discretion.80 
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit found that federal courts have the power to 
order disgorgement for insider trading violations.81 The D.C. Circuit 
reasoned that the court’s authority to order disgorgement did not arise from 
the statute, which does not explicitly authorize a monetary remedy, but 
rather from the courts’ inherent equity power.82 In fact, the D.C. Circuit 
noted that disgorgement is routinely ordered in insider trading cases, 
despite a lack of express authorization under securities law.83 
                                                                                                                                      
 72. Id.  
 73. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id.  
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. 
 78. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1220-21 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  
 79. Id. at 1221.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 1230.  
 82. Id.  
 83. Id.  
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Turning to the question of measuring the profits to be disgorged, the 
D.C. Circuit found that the $2.7 million figure delineated by the district 
court below was proper.84 The district court had arrived at this number by 
simply calculating all of the profits First City realized on the sale of the 
890,000 shares it purchased between March 14th (the date it was required to 
make a 13(d) disclosure) until March 28th (the date it actually did so).85  In 
calculating this disgorgement number, the district court relied on the 
assumption that if First City had made the disclosure when it was required, 
then the stock purchased after that date would have been much more 
expensive.86  
In finding the district court’s calculation to be proper, the D.C. Circuit 
held that “the court may exercise its equitable power only over property 
causally related to the wrongdoing.”87 Disgorgement may not be used 
punitively.88 Thus, in order to obtain disgorgement of profits, the SEC must 
distinguish between legally and illegally obtained profits.89  
At trial, the defendants vigorously disputed the $2.7 million figure, 
arguing that it was simplistic and did not take account of all the variables.90 
However, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that it would be impossible to precisely 
measure the amount of ill-gotten gain.91 Thus, the D.C. Circuit held that 
“disgorgement need only be a reasonable approximation of profits causally 
connected to the violation.”92  The D.C. Circuit established a burden-
shifting framework to prove causation wherein the SEC has the burden to 
prove (1) the defendants acted improperly, and (2) a reasonable 
approximation of the actual ill-gotten profits. Once the SEC establishes 
these two items, the burden shifts to the defendants to rebut the SEC’s 
showing of actual profits.93  
At first blush, the rule from First City Financial Corp. seems like a very 
harsh rule. However, before one can judge the equity of the rule, one must 
                                                                                                                                      
 84. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  
 85. Id. at 1230. 
 86. Id. at 1230-31. The court reasoned that had First City properly disclosed the “market 
would have been affected by the disclosure that the Belzbergs had taken a greater than 5 percent 
stake in Ashland and would soon propose a tender offer.”Id. at 1231.  
 87. Id.  
 88. Id.  
 89. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989).   
 90. Id.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. at 1232. 
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consider the prosecutorial backdrop to the rule. Insider trading94 is a 
pervasive problem in our financial system. According to its website, the SEC 
prosecutes between 500 and 800 insider-trading cases per year.95 Yet, this 
number represents merely a drop in the bucket of known insider-trading 
cases. Undetected insider trading is likely far more pervasive than the 
numbers show.  
According to a study conducted by two professors at the Stern School of 
Business at New York University and one professor from McGill 
University, nearly a quarter of all public company deals likely involve some 
kind of insider trading.96 The professors examined hundreds of transactions 
from 1996 through the end of 2012 in their study, conducting perhaps the 
most detailed and exhaustive study of its kind.97 Despite the alarmingly 
large percentage of deals involving insider trading, the professors concluded 
that the Securities and Exchange Commission litigated only “about 4.7% of 
                                                                                                                                      
 94. Insider trading is the trading of securities by one who has material nonpublic 
information. See Insider Trading, Third Edition § 2.03 (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.). However, 
insider trading is not necessarily illegal. It may be perfectly legitimate, such as when corporate 
insiders, officers, directors, and employees buy and sell stock in their own company. See United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission, Fast Answers, Insider Trading 
https://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm. (Jan 15, 2013). However, the insider trading referred in 
this Note, (and most commonly referred to by the public) to is the illegal buying or selling of a 
security, in breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust and confidence, while in 
possession of material, nonpublic information about the security. See United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Fast Answers, Insider Trading https://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm. 
(Jan 15, 2013). Insider trading violations may also include “tipping” such information, securities 
trading by the person “tipped,” and securities trading by those who misappropriate such 
information. United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Fast Answers, Insider Trading 
https://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm. (Jan 15, 2013). 
 95. Year-by-Year SEC Enforcement Statistics, 
https://www.sec.gov/news/newsroom/images/enfstats.pdf (last accessed Nov. 15, 2017). 
 96. Patrick Augustin, Menachem Brenner, & Marti G. Subrahmanyam, Informed Options 
Trading prior to M&A Announcements: Insider Trading?, at 11, http://irrcinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/Informed-Options-Trading_June-12-20141.pdf (May, 2014). 
 97. See, e.g., SEC v. CMKM Diamonds, Inc., 729 F.3d 1248, 1260-62 (9th Cir. 2013) 
($409,638.11); SEC v. Pentagon Capital Mgmt. PLC, 725 F.3d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 
2013) ($38,416,500); SEC v. Boock, No. 09 Civ. 8261 (DLC), 2013 WL 4828571, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 9, 2013) ($1,050,000); SEC v. Simone, No. 07-cv-3928 (JG), 2013 WL 4495664, at *1 
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2013) ($543,497); SEC v. Reynolds, No. 3:08--CV--0438--B, 2013 WL 
3778830, at *7 (N.D. Tex. July 19, 2013) ($10,531,225); SEC v. Graulich, No. 2:09-cv-04355 
(WJM), 2013 WL 3146862, at *7 (D.N.J. June 19, 2013) ($5,592,102); SEC v. Bass, No. 1:10-CV-
00606 (LEK/DRH), 2012 WL 5334743, at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2012) ($4,557,632). 
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the 1,859 M&A deals included in [the study’s] sample.”98 It is against this 
overwhelming tide that the courts must struggle in their quest to protect the 
rights of the public and individual investors.99  
These statistics demonstrate the significant detrimental role that insider 
trading plays in the United States, and the importance of enforcement 
actions. Given this data, the burden-shifting decision of First City Financial 
Corp. was unsurprising and pressingly needed.  However, the judges on the 
D.C. Circuit did not simply rely on their personal experience adjudicating 
fraud cases, nor did they simply research SEC statistics.  Rather, the D.C. 
Circuit anchored its decision on the reasoning from SEC v. MacDonald, 
decided only six years prior.  
B. SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983) 
In SEC v. MacDonald,100 the First Circuit affirmed the district court in 
finding that the defendant violated the antifraud provisions of the Securities 
Exchange Act and Rule 10b–5 by making purchases of trust stock without 
                                                                                                                                      
 98. Patrick Augustin, Menachem Brenner, & Marti G. Subrahmanyam, Informed Options 
Trading prior to M&A Announcements: Insider Trading?, http://irrcinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/Informed-Options-Trading_June-12-20141.pdf(May, 2014). 
 99. The primary rules used by the SEC to prosecute insider trading are 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) and 
SEC Rule 10b-5. Insider Trading, Third Edition § 1.01 (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.) (footnote 1.); 
15 U.S.C. §78j (also known as Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) provides that  
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission 
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors.  [Additionally,] SEC Rule 10b-5 . . . provides: It shall be 
unlawful for any person . . . (a) [t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, (b) [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) 
[t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase 
or sale of any security.  
[To prove insider trading under these two rules, the SEC must establish six 
elements:] (1) Use of the requisite jurisdictional means in connection with the 
violative conduct. (2) Showing a material misrepresentation or omission or other 
deceptive or manipulative practice. (3) That such false or misleading statement was 
‘material.’ (4) Showing that the defendant acted with intent, to wit, ‘scienter.’ (5) 
Showing that the defendant’s deceptive conduct was ‘in connection with’ the 
purchase or sale of the subject security.  
See 1-4 Insider Trading: Liability and Compliance § 4.01.  
 100. SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983). 
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disclosing inside information.101 The First Circuit also affirmed the lower 
court’s holding that required the defendant to disgorge profits he realized 
upon reselling the stock.102 However, the First Circuit reversed the amount 
of disgorgement required by the district court.103  Instead of requiring full 
disgorgement of all profits realized upon the resale of the stock, the First 
Circuit required the defendant to disgorge only the profits “representing the 
increased value of the shares at a reasonable time after public dissemination 
of the information.”104 In other words, the First Circuit only required the 
defendant to disgorge profits proximately connected to his illegal insider 
trading. 
The MacDonald case arose when the SEC brought a lawsuit against 
James E. MacDonald, Jr. for violating insider trading laws, specifically the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and SEC 
Rule 10b–5 promulgated thereunder in 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5.105 The SEC 
alleged that MacDonald violated these laws “by making the purchases 
without disclosing certain material inside information learned in his 
capacity as chairman of RIT’s board of trustees.”106 The district court 
ordered MacDonald “to disgorge profits of $53,012 realized on the purchase 
and subsequent sale of 9,600 shares of Realty Income Trust (RIT) stock.”107 
RIT was a publically traded real estate investment trust that owned land 
in Cincinnati, Ohio.108 RIT owned the land under the Kroger Building, 
while the actual building was owned and managed by City Center 
Development Company (City Center).109 Both the land and the building 
were subject to a first mortgage for the benefit of Prudential Insurance 
Company (Prudential).110 The lease specified that City Center would be 
obligated to pay ground rent to RIT and mortgage payments to 
Prudential.111 This arrangement proceeded smoothly until 1975, when City 
Center defaulted on both payments.112 To avoid foreclosure, RIT advanced 
                                                                                                                                      
 101. Id. at 48. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id.   
 104. Id. at 52.  
 105. MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 48. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id.  
 108. Id.  
 109. Id.  
 110. MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 48. 
 111. Id.  
 112. Id.  
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the mortgage payment to Prudential and then filed suit against City Center 
petitioning for reimbursement and appointment of a receiver.113 The suit 
was publically announced on December 4th and subsequently settled on 
December 12th.114 Though a local newspaper reported the settlement, it was 
not otherwise made known to the public.115 On the same day, RIT released 
its quarterly financial report, which contained substantially negative 
news.116  
Almost immediately after the settlement, RIT began negotiations to rent 
the building to Kenner Products.117 On December 15th, a report on the 
proposed terms of the lease was provided to the trustees of RIT, including 
the defendant.118 On the very next day, the defendant instructed his wife to 
buy shares of RIT.119 She bought 100 shares on December 16th, and the 
defendant followed suit, buying 9,500 shares on December 23rd.120  
On December 24th, RIT issued a press release, stating “the Trust expects 
to sign a lease almost immediately . . . with a major new tenant. The lease 
will bring occupancy in the building up to 95%, which would indicate a 
market value of the building of approximately $8,500,000 which is 
approximately $2,000,000 more than the existing first mortgage and RIT’s 
investment in the property.”121 Following the press release, the price of RIT 
stock shot up from $4⅝ per share to $5½ per share in two days of trading—
a rise of nineteen percent—and closed the year at $5¾ per share.122 The 
defendant retained his stock until 1977 when he sold it at an average price 
of over $10 per share.123 
After considering the facts of the case, the First Circuit acknowledged the 
general rule, established in Janigan v. Taylor,124 that a defendant should 
generally be required to disgorge the entire profits realized from the sale of 
                                                                                                                                      
 113. Id.  
 114. Id.  
 115. Id.  
 116. MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 48. 
 117. Id.   
 118. Id.  
 119. Id.  
 120. Id.  
 121. MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 48-49. 
 122. Id. at 49.  
 123. Id. at 49. 
 124. Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 
(1965), approved by the Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 
(1972). 
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ill-gotten securities—even if such securities were sold more than a year after 
illegitimate purchase—rather than be required to disgorge only an amount 
representing the increased value of the shares at a reasonable time after 
public dissemination of the information.125 The First Circuit found that 
once it is determined that the defendant actually and fraudulently made a 
profit, then the profit is “the proximate cause of the fraud, whether 
foreseeable or not.”126  
The First Circuit quoted Janigan, stating that, “[i]t is more appropriate to 
give the defrauded party the benefit even of windfalls than to let the 
fraudulent party keep them.”127 Thus, the First Circuit acknowledged that 
under the general rule, MacDonald should be required to repay the full 
amount of the ill-gotten gain. The First Circuit conceded that there were no 
special circumstances in the case at bar that would affect the general rule.128 
However, in MacDonald, the First Circuit noted that there are limits to the 
general rule.  
One such limit addressed by the First Circuit is that “where the 
fraudulently obtained securities are publicly traded, and hence readily 
available, the defrauded sellers can recover only those accretions occurring 
up to a reasonable time after they discovered the truth.”129 The reason for 
such rule is that “when a seller of publicly traded securities has learned of 
previously undisclosed material facts, and decides nevertheless not to 
replace the sold securities, he cannot later claim that his failure to obtain 
subsequent stock appreciation was a proximate consequence of his prior 
ignorance.”130  
Accordingly, the First Circuit held that “[w]hen a fraudulent buyer has 
reached the point of his full gain from the fraud, viz., the market price a 
reasonable time after the undisclosed information has become public, any 
consequence of a subsequent decision, be it to sell or to retain the stock, is . . . 
                                                                                                                                      
 125. MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 52.  
 126. Janigan, 344 F.2d at 786. 
 127. MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 53 (quoting Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965)).  
 128. Id. at 52. 
 129. MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 53. 
 130. Id. 
Consistent with this position, the ALI proposed Federal Securities Code (1978 
Official Draft and 1981 Supp.), which is said to codify Janigan, initially limits 
an insider’s liability for profits in a case like the present one to his ill-got gains, 
defined as the excess over the insider’s purchase price of the “value of the 
security as of the end of the reasonable period . . . after . . . the time when all 
material facts . . . became generally available . . . .”  
Id. at 54 (Internal Citations Omitted). 
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not causally related to the fraud.”131 The First Circuit found that any 
disgorgement beyond the amount by which the defendant profited from his 
wrongdoing would constitute a penalty.132 Thus, there should be a cut-off date 
after which the defendant’s profits are no longer proximately tied to the 
wrongdoing. In accordance with this holding, the First Circuit remanded the 
case to determine what length of time was reasonable to cut off liability to the 
defendant.133   
By limiting disgorgement to profits earned a reasonable time after the 
fraud occurred, the First Circuit in SEC v. MacDonald essentially imposed a 
proximate cause restraint on an award of disgorgement. If the SEC wanted 
to require disgorgement, it must prove that the profits were proximately 
tied to the wrong committed. As the First Circuit noted, “the defendant 
could be compelled only to disgorge profits and interest wrongfully 
obtained.”134  
Despite the contrary holding, the D.C. Circuit in First City Financial 
Corp. built on the reasoning of SEC v. MacDonald when it cited MacDonald 
for the proposition that “the line between restitution and penalty is 
unfortunately blurred, and the risk of uncertainty should fall on the 
wrongdoer whose illegal conduct created that uncertainty.”135 The Third 
Circuit would later appeal to both cases to justify its holding in SEC v. Teo 
that shifted the burden of proximate cause to the defendant. In Teo, the 
Third Circuit wrote the following: 
In First City . . . [t]he court added that “the risk of uncertainty 
should fall on the wrongdoer whose illegal conduct created the 
uncertainty.” In this context, First City cites to a case from the 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit to elaborate that the 
defendant could make its case by “pointing to intervening events 
from the time of the violation . . . .” 
 
We draw two immediate points from First City and MacDonald. 
First, intervening causation is not an element of the SEC’s 
evidentiary burden in setting out an amount to be disgorged that 
reasonably approximates illegal profits. Second, if the issue of an 
                                                                                                                                      
 131. MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 54. 
 132. Id. at 54 (quoting SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978)). 
 133. Id. at 55.  
 134. Id. at 54 (quoting SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978)).  
 135. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citing SEC v. 
MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 55 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc)).  
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intervening cause is to be raised, it will normally be the 
defendant’s burden to do so.136 
Even though the courts in First City Financial Corp. and MacDonald 
created rules that were more conservative than the rule from Teo, those 
courts still employed the same reasoning to fashion their respective 
remedies. All three courts found that the risk of uncertainty should fall on 
the defendant, and all three found that proving intervening causes is the 
burden of the defendant. Thus, the Third Circuit in Teo determined it was 
fully justified in requiring the SEC to prove only but-for cause.  
IV.  SEC V. TEO AND PROVING PROXIMATE CAUSE 
“Understanding proximate cause is . . . like understanding your mother: 
it can take years and then, just when you think you have her figured out, she 
surprises you.”137 In SEC v. Teo,138 the Third Circuit extended the burden-
shifting framework of First City Financial Corp. further than any of its sister 
courts by eliminating the SEC’s burden to prove proximate cause. In that 
case, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the 
defendants were liable for violating the Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934, Sections 13(d) and 10(b).139 The Third Circuit also affirmed the 
district court’s order to disgorge $17 million of ill-gotten profit, plus about 
$14 million in prejudgment interest.140 
In SEC v. Teo, the defendant, Alfred Teo, failed to comply with the 
reporting requirements of Section 13(d) in order to secretly exceed the 
Shareholder’s Rights Plan (commonly known as a poison pill) threshold of a 
Delaware corporation called Musicland.141 Musicland’s poison pill allowed 
current shareholders to purchase stock at a significantly discounted price as 
soon as any group or individual reached 17.5 percent ownership in the 
company.142 This poison pill device was put in place to protect against 
hostile takeovers from people such as Alfred Teo.143  
                                                                                                                                      
 136. SEC v. Teo, 746 F.3d 90, 105–06 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted). 
 137. Peter F. Lake, http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/tag/proximate-cause (last accessed 
Nov. 15, 2017). 
 138. SEC v. Teo, 746 F.3d 90 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 139. Id. at 93.  
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. at 93-94.  
 142. Teo, 746 F.3d at 93. 
 143. Id.  
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Until July 1998, Teo properly disclosed his Musicland ownership interest 
in accordance with Section 13(d).144 However, on July 30, 1998, Teo filed 
“Amendment 7” to his Schedule 13D that alleged: “Teo ceased to have 
investment powers with respect to the [MAAA] Trust.”145 Thereafter, Teo 
reported his ownership in Musicland as less than 17.5 percent, but 
continued to buy shares of Musicland through MAAA Trust.146 Throughout 
this period, Teo filed numerous false disclosures and failed to file many 
others.147 The district court found that Teo and MAAA Trust collectively 
owned 17.79 percent of Musicland shares on August 2, 1998, and 35.97 
percent on December 6, 2000.148 Because Teo under-reported his Musicland 
holdings, he was able to keep Musicland in the dark about his ownership so 
that it could not activate its poison pill.149  
Nearly two years after Teo began his secret plan to build up ownership in 
Musicland, Best Buy announced an “all-cash tender offer of all Musicland 
shares.”150 The deal was announced in December 2000, and was finalized in 
January 2001.151  During this time, Teo sold some of his shares on the open 
market and the rest to Best Buy as part of the tender offer.152 Teo’s profit 
from the sale of his personal Musicland stock as well as that of MAAA Trust 
amounted to $21,087,345.153 
In 2004, the SEC filed suit against Teo asserting violations of Sections 
13(d) and 10(b).154 The district court granted summary judgment on several 
rule violations that Teo did not challenge or appeal.155 At trial, the jury 
found that Teo violated both Section 10(b) and 13(d).156 After trial, Teo and 
the trust moved for a new trial and judgment as a matter of law.157 Both 
motions were denied.158  The district court enjoined Teo and MAAA Trust 
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from future violations of securities law and held that Teo and the Trust 
were jointly and severally liable for paying the civil penalty and for 
disgorgement of the ill-gotten profits.159  
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed each of the district court’s other 
findings before turning to the disgorgement issue.160 The defendant did not 
appeal the calculation of the disgorgement, but rather that the SEC was 
granted disgorgement at all.161 He argued that the profits were a result of 
Best Buy’s tender offer and were in no way connected to the violations of 
Section 13(d) and 10(b).162 Rather, he contended that the tender offer was 
the proximate cause of the profits.163 Thus, the district court was in error 
when it ignored the tender offer.164  
The defendant further argued that “the District Court should have 
required the SEC to demonstrate that disgorged profits ‘proceed directly 
and proximately from the violation claimed and [are] not . . . attributable to 
some supervening cause.’”165 In making this argument, the defendant relied 
on Wellman v. Dickinson,166 wherein the Second Circuit held that “[s]ince 
class plaintiffs have not demonstrated that their alleged injury was directly 
caused by the Section 13(d) violation, the district court properly denied 
their claims for damages against Dickinson.”167 
The Third Circuit noted the elements for a private action included the 
element of proximate cause,168 but distinguished Wellman by the nature of 
the action—private rather than public.169 The Third Circuit explained the 
objectives of an SEC action are different from those of a private action.170 
The SEC’s objectives are to “deprive a wrongdoer of his unjust enrichment 
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 160. Id. at 95-98, 100-01. 
 161. Teo, 746 F.3d at 101. 
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 165. Teo, 746 F.3d at 101 (internal quotations omitted). 
 166. Wellman v. Dickinson, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir.1982). 
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 168. “In order to establish a claim under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must prove that 
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and to deter others from violating securities laws.”171 The goal of 
disgorgement is “not to compensate for losses but to deprive the wrongdoer 
of his ill-gotten gain.”172 The SEC initiates suits to “promote economic and 
social policies . . . independent of the claims of individual investors”173 
rather than initiating suits to act as “a collection agency for defrauded 
investors.”174  
The SEC is not an injured investor, so in Section 13(d) and 10(b) actions, 
it is not required to prove reliance or that any investor lost money as a 
result of the violation.175 Instead, the Commission must only prove ”(1) 
material misrepresentations or materially misleading omissions, (2) in the 
offer or sale of securities, (3) made with scienter.”176  
The Third Circuit further relied on the Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution to justify its relief of the SEC’s burden of proof.177 Specifically, 
Restatement § 51(5) provides that “[i]n determining net profit [for purposes 
of disgorgement] the court may apply such tests of causation and 
remoteness . . . as reason and fairness dictate.”178 The official comments to 
the Restatement counsel against giving inordinate weight to intervening 
causes: 
To say that a profit is directly attributable to the underlying 
wrong, or (as sometimes expressed) that the profit is the 
“proximate consequence” of the wrong, does not mean that the 
defendant’s wrong is the exclusive or even the predominant 
source of the defendant’s profit. Indeed, because the 
disgorgement remedy is usually invoked when the defendant’s 
profits exceed the claimant’s provable loss, it should be possible 
in almost every case to identify additional causes of the profit for 
which the defendant is liable.179 
                                                                                                                                      
 171. Id. at 105 (quoting SEC v. Hughes Capital Corp., 124 F.3d 449, 455 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
 172. Id. at 105 (quoting SEC v. Whittemore 659 F.3d 1, 11 n.2 (D.C. Cir 2011)). 
 173. Id. (quoting SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
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 178. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 51(5)) (AM. LAW INST. 2011) 
(alterations in original)).  
 179. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 51(5) comment f (AM. LAW INST. 
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This point is elaborated upon in an example. 
[I]f the defendant embezzles $100 and invests the money in 
shares that he later sells for $500, the $500 that the claimant 
recovers is largely the result of causes independent of the wrong: 
favorable market conditions and the defendant’s investment 
acumen or simply luck. The determination in this easy case that 
the embezzler’s profit is properly attributable to the underlying 
wrong rests on a number of related judgments. The first, 
evidently a matter of causation, is a finding (or a presumption) 
that the defendant would not have made the investment (and 
realized the profit) but for the wrong. But causation in this sense 
gives only part of the answer. The conclusion that the 
defendant’s profit is properly attributable to the defendant’s 
wrong depends equally on an implicit judgment that the 
claimant, rather than the wrongdoer, should in these 
circumstances obtain the benefit of the favorable market 
conditions, acumen, or luck, as the case may be. The conclusion 
draws further support from another implicit judgment, that there 
would be an incentive to embezzlement if the defendant were 
permitted to retain the profits realized in such a transaction.180 
With these justifications from policy, precedent, statute, and the 
Restatement in mind, the Third Circuit found that the analytical framework 
for determining a remedy in an SEC enforcement suit is different than 
private suits.181 Consequently, the Third Circuit found that tort-based 
proximate cause analysis is misplaced in the context of an SEC-initiated 
action.182 Rather, according to the Third Circuit, the burden-shifting 
approach of First City Financial Corp. is essentially only a but-for causation 
test that creates a presumption of illegal profits.183 The SEC must only prove 
but-for causation to assert a reasonable approximation of illegal profits.184  
The Third Circuit next looked to SEC v. McDonald in order to hold that 
it is the responsibility of the defendant to raise an intervening cause that 
cuts off liability, rather than the burden of the SEC to disprove any 
                                                                                                                                      
 180. SEC v. Teo, 746 F.3d 90, 106-07 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
RESTITUTION § 51(5) comment f (AM. LAW INST. 2011)). 
 181. See id. at 107. 
 182. Id. at 103. 
 183. Id. at 105. 
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supervening intervening cause.185 Having established such a high bar, the 
Third Circuit easily found that the defendants had not rebutted the 
presumption of illegality, nor sufficiently proven a supervening intervening 
cause that cut off their liability.186  
A. The Dissent  
Judge Jordan dissented in part due to the majority’s loose interpretation 
of causation.187 According to Jordan, the direct causal link between the 
amount of ill-gotten gain and the amount disgorged is precisely what makes 
the remedy a remedial measure rather than a punitive one.188 Jordan did not 
dispute the majority’s reasoning that once the SEC could prove the 
transaction was “tainted,” it would create a presumption of illegal profits 
under the burden-shifting approach of First City Financial Corp.189 Jordan 
acknowledged that in this case, the SEC met its initial burden; however, 
Jordan argued that the defendants successfully bore the burden of proof 
once it had shifted to them and successfully rebutted the presumption of 
illegality by showing a supervening cause—namely the buyout by Best 
Buy.190  
According to Jordan, the majority improperly ignored the defendant’s 
evidence that some of the profits were directly caused by the buyout, not 
proximately caused by the fraud. Thus, the dissent recognized that under 
First City Financial Corp., the SEC correctly showed a reasonable 
approximation of the amount to be disgorged,191 but that was only a 
presumption, not proof positive. The defendant ought to have the ability to 
rebut the presumption and carry his burden. Jordan reasoned that the 
defendant was able to correctly show that the Best Buy sale was an 
intervening supervening cause that cut off liability to the defendant.192 The 
majority, on the other hand, held that the mere allusion to the Best Buy sale 
was not enough to carry the defendant’s burden.193  
                                                                                                                                      
 185. SEC v. Teo, 746 F.3d 90, 105-06 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 186. See id. at 109. 
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V.  CIRCUIT SPLIT 
A. The First Circuit 
In contrast to the Third Circuit, other circuits have implicitly required 
the SEC to prove proximate cause rather than merely proving but-for cause. 
The First Circuit followed its precedent set by MacDonald in a recent 2004 
decision, SEC v. Happ,194 which emphasized the importance of proving 
proximate cause in order to estimate a reasonable measure of profits 
connected to wrongdoing. The defendant in Happ argued that the amount 
of disgorgement required by the district court was not causally connected to 
his violation because he did not know the exact contents of the insider 
information he traded on.195 However, the First Circuit found that the 
defendant’s knowledge that the inside information was generally bad news 
was enough for the SEC to meet its burden to prove a causal connection.196  
Once the burden shifted to the defendant, “he failed to show that the 
amount of ‘loss avoided’ was not a reasonable approximation.197 Happ failed 
to demonstrate, for example, any ’clear break in or considerable attenuation 
of the causal connection between the illegality and the ultimate 
profits.’”198 By reasoning that the defendant could only meet his burden if 
he demonstrated an intervening cause that cut off his liability (such as a 
considerable degree of attenuation between the profits and the wrongful 
action), the First Circuit implicitly recognized the need for the SEC to prove 
not only actual cause, but also proximate cause.  
B. The Second Circuit 
Even the classic limitation of disgorgement to an equitable remedy rather 
than a punitive one has been a justification in requiring proof of proximate 
cause. The Second Circuit noted such relationship between cause and equity 
in SEC v. Cavanagh.199 In that case, the Second Circuit found that the 
amount of disgorgement cannot be more than the amount of money 
acquired by wrongdoing, because disgorgement is not a punitive remedy.200 
If the remedy were punitive, causation analysis would be immaterial. Equity 
                                                                                                                                      
 194. SEC v. Happ, 392 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2004).  
 195. See id. at 19-20. 
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demands that the defendant only pay back the amount that he stole. If the 
goal of disgorgement were to punish, the defendant would also be forced to 
pay fines or punitive damages on top of the amount of ill-gotten gains.201  
In the 1972 case, SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc.,202 the Second 
Circuit applied a much more rigorous causation standard than the Third 
Circuit did in SEC v. Teo. In finding that the district court had erred by 
over-valuing the amount of ill-gotten profits, the Second Circuit held that 
there was an insufficient casual connection between the defendants’ gain 
and their misdeeds.203 Essentially, the Second Circuit reasoned that the 
defendants could be ordered to return the money they stole, but not the 
interest they subsequently earned using such ill-gotten gains.204 The Second 
Circuit opined that to require disgorgement of the subsequent profits would 
be to punish some defendants more than others simply for being better 
investors.205  
For example, if two thieves stole ten dollars and one spent the money on 
lunch, but the other used his ten to make another ten, it would be 
inequitable to require the wise investor to pay back twenty, but the foolish 
investor to pay back only ten. Thus, the Second Circuit reasoned that part 
of the amount of profits ordered to be disgorged by the district court was 
more properly allocated to income earned on valid proceeds that were not 
proximately caused by illegal actions.206 Therefore, disgorging such valid 
profits would constitute a penalty rather than an equitable remedy.207  
C. The Ninth Circuit 
In the same way that the Second Circuit found defendants could not be 
liable for money made after the fraud ran its course, the Ninth Circuit 
found that defendants could not escape liability for divesting themselves of 
the funds after the fraud. According to the Ninth Circuit in the 2010 case, 
SEC v. Platforms Wireless Internet Corp.,208 “[t]he manner in which [the 
defendant] chose to spend the illegally obtained funds has no relevance to 
                                                                                                                                      
 201. Since SEC v. Cavanagh was decided, the Supreme Court has found that disgorgement is 
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the disgorgement calculation.”209 Such reasoning relies on the same 
proximate cause analysis used in SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc.210 If 
extra profits created long after the fraud were not proximately caused by the 
fraud, then necessarily any money lost in the same time period was also not 
proximately caused by the fraudulent activity.   
In Platforms, the Ninth Circuit required a stricter finding of causation 
than the bare but-for causation allowed by the Third Circuit. The Ninth 
Circuit held that the SEC had successfully met its burden to prove a 
reasonable approximation of profits causally connected to the defendants’ 
misdeeds, but that the defendants were unable to meet their burden to 
prove that the SEC’s approximation included anything but unjustly gained 
profits.211 Thus, the Ninth Circuit still found proximate cause to be a vital 
link in the SEC’s case against fraudsters, thereby adopting the causation 
reasoning of the First, Second, and D.C. Circuits. 
D. The Tenth Circuit  
In SEC v. Maxxon, Inc.,212 the Tenth Circuit found that temporal 
limitations must be imposed in order to cut off liability for defendants after 
a reasonable period.213 Reasoning from the purpose of disgorgement as an 
equitable remedy, the Tenth Circuit found that “some end-date 
determination is certainly necessary so that the defendant is not required to 
disgorge profits not ‘causally connected to the violation.’”214 The court 
noted that, in SEC v. MacDonald, “disgorgement was appropriate only as to 
the profits made prior to the time insider information was made public.”215 
Once the information became public, the profits were not caused by the 
insider information, but rather by the natural movement of the market.  
The Tenth Circuit held that “so long as the end date chosen results in a 
‘reasonable approximation’ of illegal profits, there is nothing wrong with 
the court itself determining that date.”216 The Tenth Circuit’s reliance on 
MacDonald’s causation analysis as well as its own holding in Maxxon—
which implied that a “reasonable approximation” takes into account 
                                                                                                                                      
 209. Id. at 1097-98 (quoting SEC v. JT Wallenbrock & Assoc. 440 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 
2006)). 
 210. See supra notes 203-06 and accompanying text. 
 211. Platform Wireless Int’l Corp., 617 F.3d at 1096-97. 
 212. SEC v. Maxxon, Inc., 465 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 213. Id. at 1179.  
 214. Id.  
 215. Id.  
 216. Id. at 1179.  
30 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:1 
 
temporal limitations associated with proximate cause principles—showed 
that the Tenth Circuit is far from abandoning the requirement that the SEC 
prove proximate cause.  
E. The Third Circuit 
 
According to the Third Circuit in SEC v. Teo, the SEC must only prove 
that the defendant’s profits were actually caused by his unlawful actions. 
Once that is proven, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the rest 
of his profits were not proximately connected to his unlawful gains. Shifting 
the burden of proximate cause to the defendant seems to be a strict rule. 
Yet, it is a rule that is extremely necessary.  
Insider trading undermines investor confidence in the fairness and 
integrity of the securities markets. Investors are unlikely to participate in 
markets where they know others have the inside track because of special 
knowledge. Even the Supreme Court has noted the danger inherent in 
illegal insider trading. The Court noted in United States v. O’Hagan,  
The [misappropriation] theory is also well tuned to an animating 
purpose of the Exchange Act: to insure honest securities markets 
and thereby promote investor confidence . . . Although 
informational disparity is inevitable in the securities markets, 
investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a market 
where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information 
is unchecked by law. An investor’s informational disadvantage 
vis-à-vis a misappropriator with material, nonpublic information 
stems from contrivance, not luck; it is a disadvantage that cannot 
be overcome with research or skill.217 
According to the SEC, “[f]ew practices, short of manipulation, have as 
deleterious an effect on the investing public’s confidence in corporate 
institutions and the securities markets as the selective disclosure of and 
misuse of so called inside information, i.e., material non-public 
information.”218  Due to its stance on insider trading, “the SEC has treated 
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the detection and prosecution of insider trading violations as one of its 
enforcement priorities.”219 
Disgorgement of profits only works as a remedy if it serves as a deterrent. 
However, if the defendant is to keep his illicit profits, then he is incentivized 
to break the law. Such a rule would create a “no lose” situation for the 
defendant. Even if the defendant is caught and must give up the money that 
he gained illegitimately, he can still keep the money he made by putting the 
illegitimate money to further use. As any first-year finance student knows, 
the use of money even for a short time has value. Such a rule would provide 
a de facto free loan from the victims to the defendant.  
The rule from SEC v. Teo is necessary because the disgorgement 
remedies employed by other circuits are not sufficient deterrents to insider 
trading and other financial crimes. Under the proximate cause standard of 
the other circuits, the defendant would be able to wriggle out of the 
“reasonable approximation” standard by arguing that the SEC has the 
burden of proving proximate cause.  
For instance, suppose several defendants were to start an investment 
company that received a variety of illegal inside information, but also made 
plenty of legitimate investments. Suppose further that the defendants made 
millions of dollars over the course of several years before they were caught. 
In the damages phase of the trial, the SEC would be able to simply prove 
that the defendants harvested somewhere in the range of $10 to $13 million 
dollars of profit from their illegal transactions. In any of the circuits, the 
burden would then shift to the defendants to prove that such an 
approximation was unreasonable. The defendants would have the 
opportunity to argue that they received only $9 or $10 million from illegal 
tips, but that the rest were profits legitimately made from investing 
decisions.   
Unfortunately, this framework is severely jeopardized by the causation 
requirements of most of the circuits. If the SEC sued in the First Circuit 
instead of the Third, causation and damages rules would directly collide. 
Instead of having to disprove the SEC’s approximation of profits in the 
damages phase of trial, the defendants could show that the SEC failed to 
meet its burden in proving proximate cause. In the above example, the 
defendants could argue that the SEC only successfully showed that $10 
million of the defendants’ profits were causally connected to the insider 
trading. The onus would be on the SEC to prove that the extra money was 
proximately connected to the fraud. Thus, the defendants would be able to 
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make an end run around the burden-shifting rule of First City Financial 
Corp.  
However, if the SEC were to litigate the case in the Third Circuit, 
causation and damages would align. In proving damages, the SEC would 
only need to show a reasonable approximation of illegal gain. Similarly, in 
proving causation, the SEC would only need to show a but-for causal 
connection between profits and bad behavior.  
Thus, in the above example, the SEC would only need to show that the 
defendants engaged in illegal behavior, and, but for that illegal behavior, the 
defendants would not have made the profits of $13 million. The burden 
would then shift to the defendants to show that the extra $3 million dollars 
was too remotely connected to the fraud to be disgorged, perhaps by 
proving that the defendants engaged in several legitimate transactions with 
the money after the initial illegal tip and it was these legitimate transactions 
that resulted in the extra profit. The causation rule from Teo is superior to 
the rule from the other circuits for two reasons: (1) it comports with the 
burdens placed on defendants in proving damages and (2) the defendants 
are in a much better position to prove causation than the SEC because the 
defendants have greater access to their financial history than the SEC. As 
the D.C. Circuit aptly stated in SEC v. First City Financial Corp., 
If exact information were obtainable at negligible cost, we would 
not hesitate to impose upon the government a strict burden to 
produce that data to measure the precise amount of the ill-gotten 
gains. Unfortunately, we encounter imprecision and imperfect 
information. Despite sophisticated econometric modelling, 
predicting stock market responses to alternative variables is, as 
the district court found, at best speculative. Rules for calculating 
disgorgement must recognize that separating legal from illegal 
profits exactly may at times be a near-impossible task. 
. . . . 
Placing the burden on the defendants of rebutting the SEC’s 
showing of actual profits, we recognize, may result, as it has in 
the insider trader context, in actual profits becoming the typical 
disgorgement measure. But the line between restitution and 
penalty is unfortunately blurred, and the risk of uncertainty 
should fall on the wrongdoer whose illegal conduct created that 
uncertainty.220 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Third Circuit may stand alone in requiring only proof of but-for 
causation from the SEC, but it does not stand in error. Disgorgement 
presents a unique proof problem because profits resulting from fraud are so 
difficult to measure. The financial markets are incredibly complex and 
increasingly fast-paced. Securities are bought and sold in large markets over 
the phone, online, or even by computer programs. Buyers and sellers 
generally do not meet in person to trade. Instead, they are separated by 
geographic distances as well as a web of third parties, including issuers, 
underwriters, brokers, and investors. This complex trading system often 
creates a complicated web of transactions that can be nearly impossible to 
untangle. Many fraudsters are masters of deception, able to launder illegal 
gains with legitimate ones, hide revenue off books, or simply take the 
money offshore. Determining which profits were caused by fraud and 
which were not is a daunting task for prosecutors.  
However, causation difficulties have traditionally been resolved in favor 
of the victim rather than the defendant. For instance, in personal injury 
claims courts developed the substantial factor test221 to address situations 
where the traditional but-for cause test fails. Rather than allow a defendant 
to escape liability because proof of causation was difficult, the courts 
fashioned a new rule that placed a greater burden on the defendant. 
Likewise, where proving causation in fraud cases is difficult, the onus 
should fall on the defendants, rather than the victims. The Third Circuit’s 
causation test accomplishes this policy by shifting the burden of proving an 
intervening cause to the defendants, rather than forcing the SEC to prove 
proximate cause.  
Critics of Teo also argue that reducing the proximate cause burden gives 
plaintiffs too much power. Relaxing the burden of proof gives plaintiffs an 
extra incentive to abuse the remedy to enlarge the award for their own 
personal gain, or so the argument goes. However, SEC enforcement actions 
are intended to promote economic and social policies, not redress the 
claims of individual shareholders. The SEC’s task is to uphold the integrity 
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of the financial markets. Thus, it is far less likely that the SEC’s 
disgorgement power will be abused, since no one will be enriched by such 
action. 
 The SEC already has greater latitude than individual litigants because of 
the lack of a financial motive. One such rule that recognizes the unique role 
of the SEC is the relaxed requirement of standing. When the Commission 
prosecutes fraudsters, it does not have to prove reliance, or demonstrate 
that any investor lost money as a result of the violation.222 The courts 
instituted such a rule because they recognize that the SEC has a unique role 
in policing the financial markets.223 The Commission should have the power 
to deter fraudsters from violating the law and cheating investors. 
Accordingly, the Third Circuit was correct in holding that the SEC need 
only establish a reasonable approximation of the illegal profits that flow on 
a but-for basis from the violations. The defendant must raise any question 
about an intervening cause. 
The Third Circuit’s rule fully comports with the underlying purpose of 
disgorgement—restoration of all ill-gotten gains. While it may seem to 
some observers that the Third Circuit has developed an onerous rule to 
burden defendants, on further examination the rule proves to be only a 
modest extension of the traditional burden-shifting framework. The Third 
Circuit did not egregiously violate the rights of defendants, but rather 
fashioned a rule that fully comports with the policy of the burden-shifting 
framework.  
Furthermore, the step is even more modest in practice. Generally, the 
traditional burden-shifting approach already usually results in full 
disgorgement of all the defendants’ profits.224 By relaxing the burden of 
proving proximate cause, the Third Circuit did more to protect the burden-
shifting framework than it did to increase the size of the SEC’s 
disgorgement remedy. Finally, the rule’s harsh effect has been most recently 
mitigated by the Supreme Court’s holding in Kokesh v. SEC.225 In that case, 
the Court held that disgorgement constitutes a penalty, and is thus subject 
to a five-year statute of limitations enacted in 28 U.S.C. § 2462.226 
Accordingly, as of 2017, the SEC no longer has the power to force 
                                                                                                                                      
 222. See SEC v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1363 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1993); SEC v. Blavin, 
760 F.2d 706, 711 (6th Cir. 1985). See also SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 
180, 191-92 (1963) (similar holding under the Investment Advisers Act). 
 223. See supra note 224.   
 224. See SEC v. Platforms Wireless Int’l Corp., 617 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 225. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017). 
 226. Id. at 1639. 
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disgorgement of profits that were illegally gained more than five years ago. 
Given restriction, as well as the other limiting factors, the holding of SEC v. 
Teo is not the egregious extension of government power that it seems to be 
at first blush, but rather a practical extension of a long-standing practice.  
 
 
 
 
